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Abstract   
 
Within this research I examine how risks of opportunistic behavior resulting from asset 
specificity,  assets which can not or can barely be redeployed to alternative use without the 
sacrifice of productive value, are best governed by specific action, result or personnel & 
cultural control mechnisms within a hybrid governance mode.  
 
Based upon the literature I have  proposed two hypothesis. First,  in case of higher human 
asset specificity, procedural asset specificity and marketing asset specificity,  the dominant 
control mechanism used for the protection of asset specificity  is personnel & cultural 
control. Secondly, that in case of  higher physical asset specificity, site specificity, dedicated 
asset specificity and temporal asset specificity, the  dominant control mechanism for the 
protection of asset specificity is action or result controls.   
 
The previous two propositions have been investigated in two case studies. One case study 
setting  is selected for its high phsysical asset specificity and the other setting is selected for 
its high human asset specificity.  
 
In the case studies both propositions are confirmed. In addition, it is demonstrated that a 
balanced distribution of asset specificity between cooperating parties is an important 
mechanism for mitigating opportunistic behavior between cooperating parties.  
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1 Introduction & problem definition  
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Transaction Cost Theory is a theory of coordination of transactions between and within 
business organizations (Steen, 2005). 
In normal, day to day business operations, organizations incur costs for primary activities like 
processing  raw goods, the costs of personnel, the shipping of end products  etcetera. 
Transaction Cost Theory (TCT) states that an organization will select the governance 
structure that minimizes the costs of effecting  transactions in total (Williamson, 1979). ‘In 
total’ means the sum of the costs for primary activities and transaction costs  for executing 
these primary activities.  
Transaction  costs are associated with activities to minimize risks from opportunistic 
behavior.  To cooperate with other companies, organizations need to explore their 
outsourcing needs,  bargain, write contracts, supervise if activities are undertaken according 
as agreed and sometimes even take legal action if conflicts arise.      
A central topic within TCT the governance structure in which transactions  are best  
organized. In general, governance  structures for effecting transactions  can be classified in 
three modes namely; hierarchy, market and hybrid (Williamson, 1991). 
The first form, hierarchy, means that transactions are executed  inside an organization (e.g. a 
legal company). The second mode, market,  is the opposite of hierarchy and is a setting in 
which many  suppliers and buyers  are available and product  and services are traded 
without longer term contracts or constraints.  
 
The third mode, hybrid, lies between hierarchy and market and contains all mixed , longer 
term cooperation’s.  Examples of hybrid modes of governance are various  long-term 
contracting agreements like franchising and Joint Ventures.   
TCT states that three elements and two behavioral assumptions predict whether a 
transaction is best undertaken within a hierarchy or ‘bought’ on the market. ‘Undertaken’ in 
this matter refers to the governance structure in which it is executed to minimize the 
transaction costs. In more common terminology this is also referred to as the ‘Make or Buy’ 
decision which many organizations face when deciding to integrate or outsource  their  
activities.  
These predicting elements are Uncertainty, Frequency and Asset Specificity. Uncertainty is 
the level of risk for unpredictable events  in the external environment . Frequency refers to 
the number and interval of the transactions.  Asset Specificity means that there are 
elements within the transaction which have little or no value outside the specific purpose of 
the transaction (Williamson, 1979).  
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TCT theory and research states that a high content of any of these three elements will favor 
a transaction to be executed and governed within an organization. The two behavioral 
assumptions, bounded rationality, the ability of agents to economize on only a limited 
amount of options and opportunism make that  transactions with high Uncertainty, 
Frequency and Asset Specificity, are best undertaken within a hierarchy, inside an 
organization. Vice Vera, a low content of any of these three elements will favor a transaction 
to be executed and governed on the market place.  
The assumption of effecting transactions on the free market is that due to competition and 
the easy of switching to other market alternatives (the lack of long term commitments), 
lower costs can be achieved. Because of  companies communicating and sharing reviews, 
bad performing companies and their products won’t survive in an open market place. 
(Williamson, 1979)  
In literature the element Asset Specificity is given much value “It is the big locomotive to 
which transaction cost economics owes much of it predictive content”. (Williamson 1998 p. 
36).  
In the previous eight decades, much research has been undertaken on the  market and 
internal organizational governance structures. Studies have been focused to see if and in 
what degree the  three elements Uncertainty, Frequency and Asset Specificity are  drivers 
for the given governance structures and what control mechanism is in place and evolving.    
In the last two decades, more and more research attention has been given to hybrid  
governance structures and hybrid governance modes  have been an increasingly popular 
way of cooperation between companies. Below two examples of asset specificity within 
hybrid governance mode are given: 
In 2005 Apple collaborated with AT&T to invest in the successful launch of its first IPhone in 
2007. The iPhone relied heavily on wireless data which was, in 2005, not a widely spread and 
advanced technology. Apple saw AT&T as a long term partner who was able to develop the 
necessary technologically investments in wireless data. Back then, both companies were 
investing in new assets which value outside the cooperation, at that time, was of less value. 
The asset specificity for both companies was high at the time.  
North Hoyle Wind Farm, an offshore wind farm has been in operation since 2003. In 2014, a 
governmental study has been finished to investigate if and how a Marine Culture (off shore 
fishing farm) might be explored and located physically within the wind farm. The perfect 
conditions (electricity, connection of nets) and already available infrastructure of the wind 
farm are an excellent location for breeding fish and managing the farm.  
On the other hand, the exploitation of the farm, physically as well as its human capital 
invested, can’t easily be copied outside the given location of the wind farm.  As soon as a 
fishing farm installs its nets or machinery, their investments are sunk. These sunken 
investments don’t cause a direct financial loss but cause, due to the non-symmetrical asset 
specificity, a negative impact to the strategic bargaining position of the farm. The previous 
will become an issue in  case of contract renewal or in case of any additional investments.  
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Given the increasing intensity and complexity an interesting area for research is whether and 
how the complexity coming from Asset Specific investments within hybrid organizations  
gives rise to certain risks and how these risks are being controlled.  
A theoretical and practically interesting question is which control mechanisms are used 
within hybrid organizations to  control and secure high asset specificity.  A interesting way to 
classify control mechanisms is according to the object of control; that is, whether control is 
exercised over actions, results, or personnel and culture(Merchant & van der Stede, 2007) 
(Groot & Merchant, 2000).  
Action Control involves steps to make sure that employees act in the organizations best 
interest. Think of passwords, audits or expenditure caps as an example.  Result Controls 
focus on the organizations strategy and on aligning employees with that strategy. Examples 
of result controls are bonus elements or incentives for achieving  certain goals.  
Personnel and cultural controls emphasize informal  group mechanisms , for instance group 
pressure or tradition to behave in certain ways of norms.  Trust is also an important driver 
within cultural controls. Personnel controls build on employees’ natural tendencies to 
control and/or motivate themselves.  
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1.2 PROBLEM DEFINITION   
 
This research will give answer to the main question:   
How can risks resulting from high Asset Specificity within hybrid governance be governed 
by control mechanisms. 
To answer this question. The following sub questions are relevant:  
1. Which risks, resulting from high Asset Specificity within hybrid governance, are 
discussed in literature? 
2. What control Mechanisms governing  risks of  high asset specific investments are 
discussed in literature?  
3. Which risks, resulting from high Asset Specific investments within hybrid 
governance, do we find in practice?  
4. What control Mechanisms are used in practice to govern  risks of high asset 
specificity  
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2  Theoretical backgrounds 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
In this theoretical  section I will  answer the first and second question in the problem 
definition: 
1. Which risks, resulting from high Asset Specificity within hybrid governance, are 
discussed in literature? 
2. What control Mechanisms governing  risks of  high asset specific investments are 
discussed in literature?  
I will start to explain the main questions in Transaction Costs Theory on governance 
structures (paragraph 2.2),   and five elements of the theory (paragraph 2.3).  In paragraph 
2.4 I will focus on seven known forms of asset specificity and the higher or lower availability 
of the seven forms.  In paragraph 2.5 I will describe the risks of asset specificity within hybrid 
governance. In paragraph 2.6 a set of  controls are given in which these risks  can be better 
controlled or mitigated.  
 
I propose that specific control mechanisms are better suited for mitigating and controlling 
risk within hybrid governance with high asset specificity. In two case studies these 
propositions will be tested.   
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In the following figure, the composition and context of the study is given: 
 
 
 
figure 1; visual construction of study model;  
 
In the most above horizontal row, three generally known governance forms are shown . The 
focus of this study is on hybrid governance. In the second  row the five elements of TCT are 
shown with a focus on asset specificity . The risks of asset specificity within hybrid 
governance are discussed and in paragraph 2.6 the found solutions in literature within 
control mechanism on these risks are shown.  
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2.2 TRANSACTION COST THEORY AND HYBRID GOVERNANCE 
 
The main question of Transaction Cost Theory is to predict in what governance mode, 
transactions are best undertaken (Williamson 1991).  
Before and in a large part of the 20th century, the main assumption in economic theories on 
markets and firms  were that resources (personnel and goods) are allocated by means of the 
price mechanism of supply and demand.  Firms or companies were described as “Islands of 
Conscious power” but no understanding was available why the choice between market or 
hierarchy  was effected (Coase, 1937, p. 388 ).  No consideration was given to the idea that 
effecting transactions on the market place or within a hierarchical organization (hierarchy) 
might actually matter in terms of transaction costs. 
Oliver E. Williamson further defined the insights of Ronald Coase and created the 
Transaction Costs Theory(TCT). TCT assumes that organizations  incur transaction costs 
besides costs for  direct activities like processing  raw goods, costs of personnel, shipping of 
end products.  Transaction costs are that costs which are not directly linked to the product 
or service.  costs for bargaining of  contracts,  supervision costs or costs associated with 
opportunistic behaviour such as extra management control. Transaction Cost Theory (TCT) 
states that an organization will select the  governance mode that minimizes the costs of 
effecting  transactions in total (Williamson, 1979). ‘In total’ then means the sum of the costs 
for direct activities but also the more indirect transaction costs  for effectively executing 
these direct activities. Transaction costs are an important part of the total costs of a firm and 
will , if not considered in business decisions, lead to ineffective governance and business 
failure.  
Transaction costs are found in all phases of the life span of a product for example: 
(1)Searching for  information, (2)drafting and negotiating an agreement, (3)Costs of 
safeguarding an agreement, (4) evaluating inputs, (5) Measuring outputs,  and (6)monitoring 
and enforcement of the agreement (Williamson, 1985).  
As stated, an important factor in TCT is to predict in what governance mode transactions are 
best undertaken Williamson defines a governance mode as “the institutional framework 
within which the integrity of a transaction is decided” (Williamson, 1979, p. 236). The 
institutional frameworks can be categorized in three modes;  hierarchy, market and hybrid 
(Williamson, 1991).  
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Hierarchy 
The first mode, hierarchy, means that transactions are being executed  inside an 
organization (e.g. a legal company). Hierarchy relies on top-down coordination mechanisms 
by managerial fiat. Ronald Coase (1937) described the question as to why person A executes 
managers B ’s request;  “because he is ordered to do so[..]” (Coase, 1937, p. 387). The ability 
to steer by command and control is strongly developed within a company simply because 
people’s careers and wages depend on a good performance within the companies rules. 
Because of the strong internal command and control, there is no strong dependency on legal 
contract law or formal contracts to get things done within the company. If a division within a 
company suffers a major loss or certain deadlines between the marketing division and the 
sales division aren’t met, the companies top management can decide whether the losses or 
late deliveries are taken for granted and or not pay out certain bonuses. In most  cases no 
legal court intervention is necessary , simply because the company is one legal entity which 
decides on its own in matters.  
 
Market  
The second governance mode of executing transactions is  the free market where many  
suppliers and buyers  are available. The main coordination mechanism of markets is the 
price mechanism  which is deciding in the relationship between buyers and sellers (Coase, 
1937). Buyers and sellers have no formal dependency or  relation to each other which means 
that simple contracts are made up (only) for delivery of a one time service or product. The 
purchasing of a laptop computer with no additional servicing contract or the purchase of 
10.000 barrels of crude oil in a trading room are examples of market transactions.  Because 
of the not existing relationship  between a buyer and a seller,  contract law is interpreted in 
a very legalistic way and the rules of contract law are strictly applied. E.g. in the Netherlands 
all consumer products and services bought via internet or ordered by phone can be returned 
within 14 days after purchasing, no questions asked.   
 
An important assumption for effecting transactions on the market is that due to competition 
and the ease of switching to other market alternatives, lower costs can be achieved. 
Changes in price and demand are easily adapted within market governance but much less 
within a hierarchy where internal pricing systems  and cultural differences can frustrate 
adaption to changes.  Due to  companies sharing bad reviews (E.g.  product reviews on 
internet) bad performing companies and their products won’t survive in an open market 
place because of the open communication and quick feedback between all parties.  
Hybrid 
The third mode, hybrid governance,  lies between hierarchy and market and contains all 
intermediate governance structures. Hybrid governance  is defined as “various forms of 
long-term contracting, reciprocal trading, regulation, franchising, and the like” assistance 
agreements, franchising, Joint Ventures”(Williamson, 1991, p. 280).  A central characteristic 
for hybrid governance is the intended longer term cooperation element which is not 
available in market governance where transactions have a single and infrequent character.  
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In general, within hybrid governance forms, organizations maintain their autonomy but are, 
to a certain level also dependent on each other. Franchising, for instance,  awards 
entrepreneurs greater autonomy than hierarchy but places franchisees under added rules 
and of the franchise holding company.  
 Hybrid governance forms are diverse and found in different forms. Below a a categorization 
of hybrid governance modes and their dependency on each other is given.  
 
i. A Joint Venture (JV) is a hybrid governance form  in which companies place a long 
term business endavour in a separate entity (the Joint Venture) with own decision 
mandate.  The dependancy of the joint venture on the mother companies is 
relatively low however within the JV, the dependancy on each other is high. An 
example of a JV  is the development of the VolvoV60 plug-in hybrid car and 
infrastructure by the Swedish companies Vattenfall and  Volvo.  A JV posesses high  
risks of interdependence on each partner contributon for profit making or losses or 
bad exposure. The JV also posesses much benefits e.g.  research, patents and new 
product development can be done in a safe and isolated environment.  
ii. In a franchising agreement in which a well established company provides its brand, 
operational model and required support to another party (the franchisee) to set up 
and run a similar business in exchange for a fee and some share of the income 
generated. Both the franchisee and the holding company have an interdependent 
but still freerelationship. The franchisee has, within the franchising’s brand rules, 
freedom  in exploiting the formula within a geographical area to its own benefit. 
much risk and insecurity is already regulated by the franchise’s proven concept and 
size advantages.  
iii. In a buyback agreement, parties agree to buy an amount of produced goods or 
services. In return, partner X buying product A, agrees to buy or invest in partners Y 
product of service B. The interdependance between companies is moderate to low 
depending on the replace ability of the  services or goods  and  limited to only the 
specified goods in the contract.  
iv. In a production agreement, parties agree to buy an amount of produced goods or 
services and agree on standard quality aspects and for instance  a small share of 
goods sold to end consumers. The interdependance between companies is relatively 
low  and  limited to only the specified goods in the contract. In case of contract 
breach or earlier termination of the contract, the cost and exposure of litigation 
often prevents parties from undertaking legal actions for the sake of the 
relationship.  
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2.3 FIVE ELEMENTS OF TRANSACTION COST THEORY  
 
Three transaction characterisctics within TCT  are uncertainty, the frequency with which 
transactions occur, and the degree to which durable asset-specific investments are incurred 
(Williamson, 1979).   These dimensions help to classify what governance mode is more 
effective given the high or low levels in a transaction . Two  behavioural assumptions play an 
important role to TCT namely opportunism and bounded rationality. These two assumptions  
explain why a certain goverance form is more effective than the other.  
Opportunism can be defined as  “Making false or empty, that is, self-disbelieved threats or 
promises, cutting corners for undisclosed personal advantage, covering up tracks, and the 
like” (Williamson &Ouchi, 1981, p. 351) Williamson states that because people are naturally 
looking for personal gain (opportunism), extra supervision needs to be in place and in case 
of a hybrid or market governance, contracts need to be drawn up to  minimize the risk of 
opportunistic behaviour. The cost for drawing up contracts are a practical  example of 
transaction costs.  
Bounded rationality can be defined as  “behavior that is intended rational but is only limited 
so” (Williamson, 1998, p.30). Bounded rationality means that individuals can only optimize 
on a limited number of alternatives and that individuals will minimize the efforts to find 
these alternatives.  Early 20th century neoclassical economic theory assumes that agents can 
and will optimize between an unlimited number of alternatives at all time.  The availability 
of bounded rationality within TCT strongly  limits the drive for efficiency because it 
acknowledges only a small amount of alternatives for a individuals to assess. An example 
and recent phenomenon in the last  decade  is the seemingly endless availability and speed 
of information on the  internet together with mobile devices to quickly assess any 
information. The previous trend of information assessing   can be put in perspective within 
bounded rationality because no matter how much alternatives are selected by a computer, 
the ability to rationally assess and choose out of these options is still limited to the agents 
capacity and personal preferences.  
As a consequence of bounded rationality, contracts are by nature unavoidably incomplete 
because they can never foresee all future events or relevant topics from happening. Further, 
the value of a contract is also limited by the fact that contract breaching is difficult and hard 
to assess and legal actions are costly and time consuming.  The presence of the earlier stated 
opportunism in itself is not a problem.  
Uncertainty  means that information about past, current and future states is simply not 
perfectly known, for various reasons( Martins et. al.,  2010). Uncertainty can arise from  not 
knowing about future states but also from the inability to determine which individuals will 
behave opportunistically  (Williamson, 1993b).  Without the existence of bounded rationality 
and opportunism, uncertainty would be much less of a problem and much less measures for 
protection transactions to behavioural uncertainty have to be in place. given the fact of  
bounded rationality and opportunism, uncertainty is a critical element.  
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Frequency  deals with the volume and recurrance of transactions. If transactions are 
infrequent or low in volume then the cost of a permanent hierarchical governance may not 
be justified.  A temporary, low profile,  hybrid setup or a one time buy on the market is a 
more cost optimizing choice. A more predictable frequency or larger volume of transaction 
does justify the establishment of an internal, hierarchical governance.  The  volume, number, 
and/or temporal spread of transactions are all included within the element frequency and 
are important to be considered (Williamson, 1985)  
Asset specificity is being defined by Williamson as the degree to which an asset can be 
redeployed to alternative uses by alternative users without sacrifice of productive value 
(Williamson 1996, p. 59)  To be more concrete, In a high asset specific environment, an asset 
can not, or can barely be redeployed to alternative use without sacrifice of productive value.  
Asset specificity is further specified in  seven different forms which are explained in pararaph 
2.5.  Asset specificity is escibed  as “the big locomotive to which transaction cost economics 
owes much of it predictive content”. (Williamson, 1998, p.36).  
 
The Sum of the five elements is that a high content of one or more of the three elements 
frequency, uncertainty and asset specificity will favor a transaction to be executed and 
governed within  a hierarchy.  (Van der Meer-Kooistra, 1994,  p131). Vice Versa, a low 
content of one or more elements favours a transaction to be executed and governed on the 
market place. Intermediate values of all elements generally cause a transaction to be 
executed in a hybrid governance mode.   
 
Deviation from the described ideal will generally cause negative side effects resulting in 
unnecessary transaction costs.  If a transaction with a low frequency, low uncertainty and 
low asset specificity, is undertaken within a hierarchy, too much levels of bureaucracy 
(transaction costs) will be the result.  The transactions will better, and more cost effective 
flourish in a competitive market environment where low cost,  high quality and low 
switching costs to alternative suppliers are fully available. If a transaction with high 
frequency, uncertainty and asset specificity, is undertaken on the market place (or in lesser 
extent within a hybrid governance structure),  more risk of ineffective governance and 
contract failure is available. Williamson states that in the previous cases, a relationship will 
be subject to “costly haggling and maladaptiveness” (Williamson, 1985, p. 15) meaning an 
ineffective governance.  
 
Dekker (2004) states that all elements but most specifically asset specificity, can give rise to 
appropriation concerns which means  the concern when one partner invests more asset 
specific knowledge or asset in a relationship than the other. The concern of being vulnerable 
from the appropriated investments by the other party gives rise to potentially opportunistic 
behavior.   
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Table 1; transaction characteristics and governance modes  
 Market  Hybrid  Hierarchy  
Uncertainty  low Medium  high 
frequency  low medium high 
Asset specificity    low Medium  High  
 
In table 1 transaction characteristics are shown on the vertical axis and the ‘best’  
governance mode on the horizontal axis.  
 
An important  consequence of undertaking high asset specific ventures with other 
companies is higher contract complexity. In a contract, to prevent opportunistic behaviour 
by the other party,  future possible events have to be mapped and anticipated. As stated 
before in 2.3,  contracts are by nature incomplete because agents can not fully  anticipate on 
every future occasion due to bounded rationality (Aghion & Holden, 2011).  If parties do 
attempt to write a very detailed contract for an already highly asset specific service in an 
uncertain, risky environment, the connected transaction costs will be very high, and 
probably not justify a cooperation in the first place.   
 
Hart & Moore (2008) state that parties, after negotiating a contract, perform relative to 
what the feel they should have gotten out of the contract and will underperform. Terms and 
procedures in a contract don’t matter at all.  Clausules in a contract to prevent unwanted 
behaviour e.g.  describing protocols and penalties for  every possible situation of a 
cooperation  won’t improve an already mistrusting, opportunistic situation. The clausules 
also make it difficult to perform on the wanted outcome.  If any party decides to go to court 
because they feel that contract agreements have been breached, the costs of legal litigation 
and the loss of reputation for both parties, would be high and therefore possibly not worth 
the endavour. In this view, detailed contracts are not  the answer to mitigate governance 
misfits.  
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2.4 ASSET SPECIFICITY FORMS WITHIN HYBRID GOVERNANCE 
 
2.4.1  HIGH OR LOW ASSET SPECIFICITY  
 
 
Transactions with a low and medium level  of asset specificity are generally undertaken 
within respectively market and hybrid governance Higher quantities of asset specificity 
within maket or hybrid governance contain higher risks of ineffective governance and 
contract failure caused by the larger risks of opportunistic behaviour and limiting abilities of 
bounded rationality.  
 
2.4.2  ASSET SPECIFICITY FORMS  
 
 
Asset Specificity can be found in several forms.  All forms can be available in higher or lower 
quantity.  Initially, Oliver E. Williamson specified four different forms; site specificity, physical 
asset specificity, human asset specificity and dedicated asset specificity (Williamson, 1983). 
In the following years several authors identified more forms of asset specificity.  Van der 
Meer-Kooistra identifies marketing asset specificity (Van der Meer-Kooistra, 1994). 
Geyskens, Steenkamp en Kumar(2006) use goodwill asset specificity.   Zaheer & 
Venkatraman identified, within their research  in a services environment  procedural  asset 
specificity. Masten, Meehan & Snyder identify temporal asset specificity (Masten, Meehan & 
Snyder, 1991). Gatignon & Anderson identify brand capital specificity. In the below  table, all 
seven forms of asset specificity are specified with a description and example.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17 
Table 2; asset specificity forms  
 
 Form asset 
specificity  
Description  Example  
1 Site  specificity  Facilities are located so that 
inventory and 
transportation expenses are 
minimized. (Lohtia, Brooks 
& Krapfel, 1994)  
A coal energy plant which is deliberately located near a 
commercially exploited harbor which is its only source of 
supply is an example of site specificity.  
2 Physical asset 
specificity  
Assets are developed or 
customized to a particular 
use or purpose (Lohtia, 
Brooks & Krapfel, 1994) 
A die which is especially fitted to a specific formula 1 
racing team car.  
3 Human asset 
specificity 
Employees develop firm 
specific skills or 
knowledge(Lohtia, Brooks 
& Krapfel, 1994) 
Knowledge and training for  a very specific item. Backlog 
handling of work items within a customized IT system of 
a service company.  
4 Dedicated asset 
specificity  
Dedicated assets occur 
when additions are made 
to an existing machine or 
device that would not be 
made but for the 
expectation of selling 
significant product to a 
particular customer on a 
long term basis (Lohtia, 
Brooks & Krapfel, 1994) 
A small sized company delivering half products to an 
original equipment manufacturer (OEM)  may invest in 
customizing a machine for the sake of delivering extra 
capacity, agreed in a contract with the OEM. When the 
OEM decides, or even threatens to discontinue the 
contract, overcapacity which cannot be sold elsewhere is 
the result.  
 
5 Temporal asset 
specificity  
Specificity when timely  
responses by on-site 
human assets is vital. 
(Lohtia, Brooks & Krapfel, 
1994) 
When building a house timely delivery of the right 
building materials and building professionals is key to a 
timely delivery of the completed house.  
6 Procedural 
asset specificity  
The degree a firm's 
workflows and processes 
are customized  
in line with the 
requirements of the 
exchange  
partner (Malone, Yates, and 
Benjamin, 1987). 
If a commercial service company works with an outside  
partner for delivering their sales and orders of 
commodity products, it may need to make large 
investments to align its procedures and IT processes so 
that orders can be efficiently  transferred and handled.  
7A Marketing 
asset specificity  
Specificity arising in the 
selling phase of a product 
life cycle (Van der Meer-
Kooistra, 1994 p131) 
Investments in a particular brand can lose their value 
very quick if the reputation of a company is compromised  
(Buckler beer in the Netherlands)  
7B Goodwill asset 
specificity  
Idiosyncratic investments in 
brand name capital 
(Williamson,  1991 p 281)  
 
7C Brand capital 
asset specificity  
Brand capital is an 
investment in reputations 
(Lohtia, Brooks & Krapfel, 
1994) 
 
 
 In case of Marketing asset specificity and the rows below (7a,b,c)   all definitions and 
descriptions give a more or less, same explanation but use different names. To improve the 
quality of reading and to avoid unnecessary complexity  the term  marketing asset specificity 
will be used to cover all three descriptions.  
 
More than one asset specificity can appear at the same time. Also the boundaries between 
the forms are not strict and some overlap overlap can appear. Below two examples are given 
to illustrate how  asset specific investments in a governeance mode looks like.  
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Marketing asset specificity is widely used by hotels as a mean to gain commitment from 
subcontractors. These commitments are designed to reduce the chance of a contractor (a 
supplier) to act opportunistically.  Lamminmaki (2005) has done research within a 
hotel/services environment in which a luxury hotel  outsources the management of one of 
its restaurants to an expensive, high standard,  specialist restaurant with a reputation for 
high quality dining. Where, in normal cases, hotels are reluctant to outsource for the fear 
destroying  the hotels  overall reputation, this hotel deliberately chooses the specialist 
restaurant as it has its own high reputation to protect.  The asset specificity creates a 
mutual, symmetrical,  dependency in which both parties have hostages (prestige) to lose. If 
the contracted services are poorly delivered, the hotel’s image ánd the restaurant image will  
both suffer. 
 
Another example is  the outsourcing of a hotel’s indoor plants. A subcontractor owned, 
maintained and replaced the plants if necessary. Though if the  contracts were to end and no 
contract renewal was granted to the subcontractor,  a lot of excess plants would be left to 
the contractor.  Removing and re-contracting of the plants will be a costly operation and 
plants can be damaged or die from  a moving operation.  The dedicated  asset specificity in 
this case is non-symmetrical and solely on the side of the subcontractor.  
 
 
2.5 RISKS OF HIGH ASSET SPECIFICITY WITHIN HYBRID GOVERNANCE 
 
 
High asset specificity, favors a transaction to be executed within a hierarchy  , sometimes 
within a hybrid governance mode but in no case in market governance.  In practice the ideal 
mode however simply  isn’t always chosen which is a risk that can lead to extra transaction 
costs or non-optimal hierarchical governance.   
 
In this section, two important  factors are given which highly shape the risks of opportunistic 
behavior of asset specificity within hybrid governance. The factors are the symmetrical (all 
sides) or non-symmetrical (one side)  exposure to asset specificity. The second one is the 
possibility to measure the output of high asset specific transactions within a hybrid 
governance mode. Both factors are found separately in recent literature but have not been 
investigated integrated within hybrid governance.  
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2.5.1 SYMMETRICAL OR NON SYMMETRICAL (LOCK IN)  
 
A party in a cooperation which single handedly invests specific assets, is ‘locked in’ to a 
transaction meaning that one party in a cooperation has invested highly, and one party in 
the cooperation has invested much less in asset specificity.  In this case,the ‘non symmetrical 
asset specificity’ can be the direct result of a transaction (a signed contract) in which one 
party consciously or unconsciously accepts the terms of a contract. Non symmetrical asset 
specificity can also evolve and increase during a relationship. In the below three alineas, 
three risks of non symmetrical asset specificity are explained.  
 
 
Lock in. Asset specificity can have a negative effect on an original equipment manufacturer 
(OEM).  An OEM is an end producer of completed product out of sub parts delivered by 
external suppliers.  In some cases specialized assets, exclusively produced for an end 
product, are worth little outside the present relationship.  An OEM needs  the specific 
supplier  for that specific part otherwise its completed end product won’t be realized. The 
supplier knows the OEM is ‘locked in’ to the relationship and therefore their motivation to 
provide superior performance could be reduced.  The suppliers  options to save on the costs 
of the relationship is generally not saving on the output or agreed service because these are 
generally agreed on in the contract, but to cut back on the amount of operational resources 
or R&D which can have a negative  impact on delivery performance and the  buyer's 
satisfaction.  (Vita et al., 2010).  
 
 
Recontracting (dis)advantages. The winner of an initial contract can, in case of asset 
specificity, have a starting advantage in further rounds of contract prolongation because he 
has already made the required specialized investment necessary to deliver the service. 
Potential competitors are unlikely to appear, or enter the tender a financially less attractive 
bid,  because they are unwilling to take the high costs of the initial specialized investment 
(Brown and Potowski , 2005).  
 
 
Monopoly. The above factors, Lock in and re-contracting disadvantages, can slowly 
contribute to the making of a monopoly or duopoly, a market where respectively only one, 
or a very limited amount of supplier(s) can deliver the requested services.  In a case study of 
municipal government services in the USA only one service provider could deliver specific 
medical services to several municipal governments. The medical service provider worked for 
several other municipals which put  the governmental municipals in a strategically 
disadvantaged bargaining position and lock in. (Brown and Potowski , 2005) 
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2.5.2 LEVEL OF MEASUREABILITY 
 
Ouchi (1980) states that performance assessment is key to cooperating parties and that 
clear performance assessment can even overcome high levels of opportunism and goal 
incongruence. On the other end,  Brown and Potowski  (2005) conclude in a study within 
municipal government on outsourced services that the risk of contract failure is extremely 
high if services are being performed by a monopolist ánd the output measurability of these 
services is low.  
Within a high asset specific hybrid govenance collaboration  this implies that being able to 
assess whether the opposite party is performing as planned, can give rise to lower 
opportunism and conflicts. 
 
In case of a long term contract where inputs and outputs can easily be identified and 
counted alike, simple management reports can  assess whether a party in which an asset 
specific investment has been made, is performing as agreed. The ability to assess the 
performance of the other party can reduce mistrust, approprioation concerns and 
opportunism.    If on the other hand inputs and outputs can not easily be measured due to 
longer completion time or non measureable criteria, the effectiveness of a cooperation is 
harder to  assess. Feelings of mistrust and opportunism are then likely to appear and further 
worsen a collaboration. 
 
Ease of measurement is therefore a serious  complicating risk factor for collaborations with 
higher forms of asset specificity.  Brown and Potowski (2005) investigated the outsourcing of 
social services in a rural area in the USA based on a survey of 64 municipal service managers.  
The research focused on the degree of  asset specificity within a collaboration and on the 
degree  to which the output was measurable.   
 
A service is easy to measure if it is relatively straightforward to monitor the activities 
required to deliver the service and to identify performance measures that accurately 
represent the quantity and quality of the service. For easy to measure services, one can 
clearly specify  activities and outcomes for a  vendor to perform and achieve. Also it is easy 
for a contractor to monitor the quality and quantity of the activities and their outcomes.  
At the other end of the scale, a service is difficult to measure if it is hard to monitor the 
activities required to deliver the service and to identify performance measures that 
accurately represent the quantity and quality of the service. For difficult to measure services 
one cannot easily write a contract and clearly specify the activities and outcomes for the 
vendor to perform and achieve.  (Brown & Potoski, 2005)  
Brown and Potoski see the combination of asset specificity and output measurement 
difficulties as a major risk factor for contract failure. Contracted services like; Drug and 
alcohol treatment, children’s Welfare programs and the operation of Mental Health 
programs all have a high tacit, human asset specific character. A trust relationship, between 
a doctor and a patient e.g. is not easily transferrable to another location or use without loss 
of value. Specific knowledge of customers or patients can also come at great cost and time 
and is also not easily redeploy able without the loss of value. In their research, these services  
receive a  low scoring to the easy of measurement which means that their output is hard to 
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quantify and measure.  How can the success of a drug addiction cure be best quantified? Or 
how can the output of a childrens welfare program be best measured?  Even if outputs can 
be quantified to a certain level, another problem arises when or if a certain output or goal  is 
ever reached. Brown and Potoski state that successful treatment of drug or alcohol addiction 
can often only be partly established after a very long team while the risk of return of the 
addiction is often imminent and many other factors influence the chances of return.  
Vita, Tekaya & Wang (2011) state that  human asset specificity is complex and by nature 
hard to measure compared to  other forms of asset specificity.  The same seems valid for 
higher forms of marketing asset specificity in which the reputation of one or both 
organizations is at stake . Reputation depends on on many factors like   is hard to quantify is 
simple measurable elements. Procedural asset specificity is used to measure connections of 
workflows and procedures within services environment and has a relative high overlap with 
human asset specificity. 
It can be argued then that in case of  high human asset specificity, marketing asset specificity 
and procedural asset specificity, the relative difficculty to assess whether the opposite party 
is performing as planned, can give rise to higher  opportunism and conflicts  
In case of other contracted services in the research of  Brown and Potowski (2005),  services  
like waste disposal, water treatment, electricity utility management,  the measurement of 
outputs cán be based on quantifiable outputs. Physical goods can be described by form and 
number, output of water or electricity can be quantified  in units like M3 and Kwh.  
Joskow (1985) and later Van der Meer-Kooistra (1994) also point to a similarity between 
physical, site and dedicated asset specificity in which they all are defined as being meant for 
tangible and measurable assets or goods. They describe the exploitation of a coal mine and 
an electricity plant in which the investments in infrastructure and machines (physical asset 
specificity) and location of the electricity plant (site specificity) and the one time large 
investment made for 30+ years of exploitation (dedicated asset specificity) are all tied 
together and show overlap. The investments all have a high measurable character. In 
addition, in case of temporal asset specificity, the timing of assets is key, timing is a highly 
quantifiable elements and therefore also measurable element.  
 
It can be argued that in case of physical asset specificity, site asset specificity, dedicated 
asset specificity and temporal asset specificity,  the relative ease to assess whether the 
opposite party is performing as planned, can give rise to lower opportunism and conflicts.   
The level of measureability therefore is a factor which, depending on the asset specificity 
form,  shapes the risks of opportunistic behavior of asset specificity within hybrid 
governance.  
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2.6 CONTROL MECHANISMS FOR REDUCTION OF OPPORTUNISTIC BEHAVOIUR  
 
In literature, several  ways of reducing opportunistic behavior resulting from  asset 
specificity are discussed.  In the below alinea two general views of control on asset 
specificity which apply to a hybrid governance mode, are elaborated. In the following 
alinea’s two connected controls mechanism which are interesting to be further investigated, 
are elaborated .  
 
In case of a lock in, mentioned in paragraph 2.5.1, a company can decide that a third party 
will perform a part of the contract, or  a firm itself will keep a small percentage in-house to 
keep internal capability and not fully loose sight of the outsourced work. The in-house 
capability will reduce effects of a lock in (Geyskes, Steenkamp & Kumar, 2006).   Also a 
hybrid governance mode itself, mentioned in paragraph 2.2,   is a protection mechanism. In 
a joint venture, due to mutual investments in the joint venture and its distance  to its parent 
company, asset specificity  can be controlled relatively safer than in a simple buyback 
agreement.  
 
Within a chosen hybrid government mode however, two control mechanisms can be 
distinguished. Firstly the level in which asset specificity is evenly divided between partners 
within a hybrid governance mode, so called ‘hostage taking’ or ‘reciprocal investments’ 
(Williamson, 2009) . Both terms mean that partners have invested in asset specificity on 
each side of the collaboration to prevent one party from being able to participate in 
opportunistic behaviour.  
 
Secondly, Merchant & Groot (2000) Introduce a  generally accepted dimension of control 
namely;  control mechanisms. Within these control mechanisms,  control can be exercised by  
actions, results or through culture & personnel. Below these three forms are elaborated.   
 
Action control Action control means that control is exercised so that certain desirable 
actions are taken (or undesirable actions not taken). The management of an organization 
can give itself the right to make key decisions,  they can physically or digitally  secure 
valuable company assets  and they can require personnel to follow certain pre-approved 
policies or contract terms. Action control can be exercised by  legal, physical, or 
administrative means. A general way of action control is a formalized contract in which the 
described services,  terms of liability, litigation, ending of contract etcetera are formalized. 
Within action control, these agreements, formalized in a contract facilitate the cooperation’s 
needs and daily procedures in most of the cases.  
To steer and intervene by  action control mechanisms, it has to be clear what interventions 
are necessary  to meet certain goals or avoid negative results. Precise measurement, the 
ability to measure the output play an  important role within action control. 
Result  control In case of result control partners can focus on results and intervene only 
when targets are not being met. Result control ensures that employees, teams and divisions 
are promised rewards for producing desired results. On the other side, punishments or 
malus is given for results that are unwanted or should be avoided. Result control stimulates 
employees to choose and  take  the actions that lead to the desired results.  
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A prerequisite element for result controls is the availability to measure results effectively. 
Employees naturally want to know how to get a bonus and financial managers want to 
measure the effects of investments and set the strategic course. The previous requires that 
results can be measured precise , free from bias, in a short time lag between the action and 
the result so that employees understand how to set course . If any of these elements are not 
clear, result controls can be a very strong counterproductive control element in a way that 
an organization is steering for the wrong goals. 
Personnel and cultural controls.  Personell control is aimed at the selection of key personnel. 
A main driver for personnel control is a natural present force that pushes employees to the 
organization’s goals and derives self-respect and self-satisfaction.  Cultural controls are a 
way of control in which group pressure plays a major role. Cultural controls can be built on 
traditions, norms, and attitudes. In the jewish community in New York and countries in 
Southeast Asia, agreements, due to cultural controls, are sealed and maintained by verbal 
agreements. In both personnel and cultural control mechanisms, trust and a good 
relationship plays an important factor. Both management and employees are given trust as a 
substitute for more formal action and result controls.  Trust enables them to perform on 
their own motivation. Personnell and cultural control is an already naturally present form of 
control which, if used within a company or collaboration,  needs to be respected in a way 
that their benefits can be gained. For their major overlaps, cultural and personnel control 
mechanisms are taken as one control mechanism within this reaserch.  
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2.7 HYPOTHESIS 
 
I n case of  high human asset specificity, marketing asset specificity and procedural asset 
specificity, the relative difficculty to assess whether the opposite party is performing as 
planned, can give rise to higher  opportunism and conflicts. Also  in case of physical asset 
specificity, site asset specificity, dedicated asset specificity and temporal asset specificity,  
the relative ease to assess whether the opposite party is performing as planned, can give 
rise to lower opportunism and conflicts.   
 Merchant (2000) describes  a set of specific control mechanisms which differ in their need 
for clear and measurable output. Action control and result control mechanisms have a high 
dependency on clear and quantifiable goals. Cultural controls thrive on trust intrinsic 
motivation and do not have a need for clear quantifiable goals. The previous findings make 
the following hypothesis interesting for further research  
A. Within hybrid governance and in case of higher human asset specificity, 
procedural asset specificity and marketing asset specificity, due to the less 
measurable output, personnel and cultural controls will be used as 
dominant steering mechanisms.  
B. Within hybrid governance In case of higher physical asset specificity site 
specificity, dedicated asset specificity and temporal asset specificity, due to 
the more measurable output, result and action controls will be used as  
dominant steering mechanisms.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
25 
3    Methodology and design  
 
In this section, the design for this study is motivated. For investigating the two hypotheses, 
seven forms of asset specificity and linked control mechanisms can be identified.  A general 
characteristic of these variables is the fact that they are not easily distinguished because 
they are embedded in  a blurred, real life setting  which is impossible to isolate from the 
outside world.  The  hypotheses are therefore best investigated in a  case study design.  A 
case study is a research situation in which the number of variables of interest far outstrips 
the number of datapoints (Yin, 1994, p. 13)  The specific type of case study is explanatory 
because in this case study research the hypotheses, based on the literature, will be tested. 
 
The most important criterium for the selection of the case studies is their connection to the 
hypotheses. For each hypothesis in this research a fitting case study situation has been 
found in which all the elements of the hypothesis are expected to be present.  A second 
important criterium for each case study is the availabiliy of a longer and continuously 
enduring,  cooperation.  Asset specificity can, due to longer tem collaboration,  often 
become more intense.  In case of human asset specificity, tacit knowledge  is often low at 
the start but evolves when a cooperation between two organizations continues. Logically, 
Asset specificity decreases or stops  when a cooperation is being discontinued.  For this 
specific research a minimum of a five year, continuous, relationship has been taken as norm.   
 
The following case studies have been selected: 
 
1 Case study  Vestas - Nuon.  In this case study the relationship between Vestas, a supplier of 
Wind Turbines and Nuon, a customer of Vestas and exploiter of Wind Parks is being 
investigated. Due to the importance of physical assets, the wind turbines,  and the aspect of 
physical inmobility of the assets,  high physical asset specificity and site specificity is 
expected to be present. Unfortunately, due to protection of strategical information only 
Nuon has been willing to agree on interviews and no ability to assess interviews from Vestas 
side has been available.  
 
2 Case study Oxyma – Nuon. In this case study the relationship between Oxyma as a 
marketing services provider and Nuon as a customer of the delivered services is being 
investigated. Due to the importance of knowledge and the way in which the workflow 
processes of Nuon and Oxyma are tied together, high human asset specificity and procedural 
asset pecificity is expected to be present.  
 
Within the case studies Vestas-Nuon and Oxyma-Nuon, the unit of analysis is the 
relationship between both parties. Within that relationship asset specificity and connected 
control mechanisms are available. 
 
The selection of the respondents has been made in accordance with a selected key person 
per case study. After a phone call and a positive response of the key person, a request with 
general information on the topic and a copy of the interview questions have been sent.  
Together with this key person, the other persons for the interviews have been selected.  In 
the Vestas-Nuon case study, in total three persons have been selected and in the Oxyma-
Nuon case study, in total six persons have been selected. After the selection of all 
respondents, the respondents have been given the same preparation information for the 
interview as the initial key persons.  
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The main source of gathering information for the case studies is interviews. In specific  cases, 
additional information was requested from the interviewees for further clarification. In all 
situations the formal contract agreement between parties has been requested beforehand 
by the interviewer for preparation of the interviews.  
 
The questions within the interviews are directly based on the questions list. The main topics 
in the interviews are the seven forms of asset specificity, three forms on control mechanisms 
and the causal connection between the asset specificity and control mechanisms.  A copy of 
the question list is enclosed as separate attachment to this research.  All interviews have 
been held face to face and have been recorded on audio. After the interview, the audio 
transcript has been literally translated to paper. Each interviewee has been given a written 
transcript of their interview text and a document in which the case study itself, chapter 4 or 
5 in this research, is written down. Three respondent, one in the Vestas-Nuon case study and 
two in the Oxyma-Nuon case study, have given feedback which has been  evaluated and  
added to  the final results of the case studies afterwards.   
 
Concerning the construct validity, different sources of information have been used in 
addition to the interviews and to ensure data triangulation. As discussed above In section 10 
a list of additional and documents is available.  Concerning the internal validity, the 
establishment of causal relationships,  Three persons on each side of the cooperation have 
been interviewed to ensure that answers can be compared and backed by the findings in 
previous interviews. In the case study Vestas-Nuon however only three persons on Nuon 
side have been interviewed.  To ensure the internal validity, a specific question in the 
interviews is if a causal relationship is available from the asset specificity within the 
cooperation to the control mechanisms in casu.  The external validity in this case study, the 
way that the results can be generalized to other settings, is medium to  low. Only two 
specific settings have been investigated. Within these settings however, the relationship 
between a utilities company and a wind turbine manufacturer, and the relationship between 
a utilities company and a marketing services supplier, similar results could be expected.  
 
The reliability of the research  is ensured by a research database with a consequent mapping 
of the  documentation  and audio formats.  All interviews have been conducted on a face to 
face basis and have been recorded on audio in one mp4 file per interview. All audio 
transcripts have been literally translated into a word transcript per interview. Per interview, 
the word documents have been scanned for phrases and quotes of asset specificity and 
control mechanisms. The result has been mapped into an excel per case study. For 
explanatory reasons and proof, some quotes have been mentioned literally in the case 
studies and can be traced back literally in the audio and word transcripts in the research 
database. The nine audio formats ánd written transcriptions in the database can be accessed 
after a request to the author. 
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4  Case study Vestas-Nuon  
 
The Dutch government together with lower government bodies,  committed itself to the 
goal of 14% renewable energy in 2020. For wind turbine based energy this goal is translated 
into a more specific goal. Compared to 2013, an increase of  300%  more land based wind 
energy (on-shore)  and a 2000% increase for sea based wind energy (off-shore). The dutch 
government is committed to reach this goal by means of supporting and subsidizing 
investments in wind energy and pointing out specific areas on-shore and off-shore which are 
suitable for the exploitation of wind farms.  
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/duurzame-energie/inhoud/windenergie  
Consulted on 18th  February 2016 
 
Several traditional utility companies like Essent/RWE, Eneco and Nuon/Vattenfall see their 
traditional ways of generating revenues on fossil fual generation decline. The companies and 
sector are victim to a negative public image due to environment and carbon dioxide  
emission goals. The companies anticipate on renewable sources of energy and expand their 
wind energy business. Currently wind energy is a fast growing and relevant topic for almost 
all utility companies.   
 
Nuon is a traditional Dutch utility company and has been taken over in 2009 by a Swedish, 
state owned Utility company named Vattenfall AB. An international Business Area within 
Vattenfall is Business Area (BA) Wind. In BA Wind all new investments and installation of 
wind park projects, operation and maintenance of current wind turbines are undertaken. In 
the Netherlands The BA wind is divided in on-shore and off-shore operations. The case study 
is undertaken within on-shore Netherlands, meaning all land based wind parks in the 
Netherlands.  
 
Nuon relies on external parties like Senvion, Siemens, Enercon ánd Vestas for 
manufacturing, engineering and construction of  the wind turbines.  If a new wind park is to 
be built or if existing wind turbines within these wind parks are end of life and 
decommissioned, Nuon is selecting a new partner by tender. In these tenders the main 
criteria are financially driven and low costs and a high NPV (net present value) of the bidding 
offers are an important selection criteria.  
 
Nuon currently relies on external parties for the servicing and repair of the wind turbines. In 
most cases a wind turbine manufacturer like Vestas is also the contracted party for service 
and maintenance in the first 2-5 years. After that period, due to the lower costs involved,  a 
non-manufacturing specialized service party like Certion, Bettink or  GES  is selected to 
execute the maintenance and repair for the resulting life span of the wind turbines.  
 
Vestas is one of the biggest wind turbine suppliers for Nuon. Currently Vestas is servicing 37 
Wind turbines, divided over 6 wind farms for Nuon. Vestas is an international company 
operating in the engineering,  construction, operation and servicing of wind energy. Vestas 
has installed over 53.714 Wind turbines which operate in 73 countries in  6 continents over 
the world(Annual report Vestas, 2014) .  In 2014 Vestas was the  world wide market leader 
in turbine manufactures with a market share of 13,2 %. In total the top 5 turbine 
manufacturers hold 47,9% of the global market share.  
http://issuu.com/energydigital/docs/energydigital november2014/41?e=12457992/9854388  
Consulted on 18th  February 2016 
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The relationship between Vestas and Vattenfall lasts for 15 years.  A deciding factor for the 
continuous relationship lies in the tendering process in which Vestas has always been able to 
offer  bigger, higher megawatt output wind turbines than the, at the moment of the tender 
available, normal market standards.  Especially in the Netherland where free space for 
installing large amounts of space consuming wind turbines is scarce, the possibility to have 
high output turbines on a relatively small area has been a key factor in the choice for  Vestas 
in several previous tenders.   
 
On Nuon side three persons have been interviewed. All interviewees are working within a 
Dutch, on-shore country scope. These persons are; the manager Onshore Operations 
Netherlands, responsible for the operation of all on- shore wind turbines of Nuon in the 
Netherlands. The second person is an expert in the analysis of management- and technical 
reports and contracts with external service or hardware suppliers. The third person is 
responsible for the operation of all Vattenfall wind turbines in the north of the Netherlands. 
All three persons have regular direct contact with Vestas. 
 
 
Asset specificity findings  
 
Quote 1 nl:  
“Een Vestas turbine is eigenlijk meer een samenraapsel, klinkt een beetje denigrerend, maar 
dat is het eigenlijk wel, van verschillende turbine core elementen die door andere partijen 
geproduceerd worden. Zit een tandwielkast in, die tandwielkast wordt niet door Vestas 
gemaakt. Die kopen ze in bij Hanse, die kun je bij Windenergy halen, die kun je bij Noventus 
halen. Die maken allemaal tandwielkasten geschikt om Vestas V80 te bieden. Hetzelfde geldt 
voor de generator. Hetzelfde geldt voor de transformator. Het enige waar Vestas zich echt in 
onderscheidt, is denk ik de bladen die ze zelf produceren, maar dat zou je eventueel ook nog 
van een derde  partij eraan kunnen hangen”.  
 
Quote 1 eng:  
“A Vestas wind turbine is in fact no more than a mishmash, sounds a bit degrading but in 
fact it is true.  It is a combination of key elements, produced by other parties. There is a 
gear-box made by Hanse,  Windenergy or Noventus. All these parties make a gear box 
suitable for the Vestas V80. The same goes for the generator and the transformator. The 
only thing that is really distinguishing for Vestas are the rotor blades which they produce 
themselves but even these blades could be changed by blades from another party”.  
 
In the above quote it is stated that a lot of the essential parts of the wind turbines that 
Vestas is manufacturing, are interchangeable qua parts and are not uniquely tailored to wind 
turbines of Vests and the relationship between Nuon and Vestas. This quote and other 
statements in the interview illustrate that, in general, physical asset specificity  for these 
parts is not high. It is nót always common that wind turbines and their parts are 
manufactured out of mainly generic and interchangeable parts. Enercon is a manufacturer 
who’s parts are quite unique and not interchangeable which makes them more scarce and 
as a result various companies delivering services and repair after the initial contracting 
period  activities aren’t able to service these turbines.  
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Some parts of the Vestas Wind Turbine however do have high physical asset specificity. Two 
interviewees mentioned four specific parts: (1) An RCC, which is a device for storing energy 
surpluses, (2)a transformator, (3)a valve for a grease pump for lubrication of the turning 
parts of the wind turbine and finally (4)a controller which is a piece of software that 
functions as the technical brain and regulator of the  wind turbine.   
 
The first three  parts are not only unique due to their technical complexness but also due to 
the fact that Vestas has a unique seller right on these items. Nuon is not allowed to make 
this parts on their own specification. Companies who do manufacture these parts do so on 
an exclusive seller license to Vestas.  Regarding part 2, the transformator, a new 
transformator, costs around €25-€30.000,-- when bought new from Vestas. If made to 
specification by an alternative supplier, the transformator is estimated to cost 10.000,-- less.  
 
For part 1,2 and 3 some spare parts are available to Nuon and stored after an older wind 
turbine is dismantled. New  parts however aren’t free for reproduction and sale which does 
make them unique.  
 
Part 4, the controller, is updated regularly by Vestas through software updates. These 
software updates make the machines more stable and deliver more output. The software 
updates are only delivered within a Vestas AOM 4000 and AOM 5000 Vestas contract forms 
which are the most expensive, and  a minority compared to lower service (AOM <= 3000 ) 
contracts offered by Vestas.  Of the 6 wind farms serviced by Vestas,  2 are AOM 4000 
contract forms and 4 are AOM 2000 forms.  
 
When questioned if the not updated controller software could potentially lead to problems 
the answer was that, although new updates were not installed,  the inconvenience is mild. 
Sometimes software is installed via an alternative route and  in general the wind turbine will 
not stop functioning or function much worse due to not up-to-date software.  
 
Procedural asset specificity is found in the setup of the contracts between Vestas and Nuon. 
All wind turbine manufacturers currently have their own contract templates as a basis for 
the agreements. This means that Nuon actively has to adjust and bargain terms and policies 
after every tender to get it’s own terms mentioned or altered. Standard procedures for 
ordering materials and performance indicators for measuring results are initially tailored to 
Vestas which at least gives Nuon a disadvantage in the translation of  Nuon’s own terms and 
policies in the contract. Vestas offers  standardized contracts to their customers wich mainly 
vary in five standardized forms from AOM (Active Output Management) 1000 until AOM 
5000, which is the most full serviced contract form. Customers,  like Nuon,  choose the level 
of service they want for a certain price, connected to a wind turbine or park. When asked to 
give a grade between 0 and 10, a 7 was given to present the degree to which the current 
contract terms  are tailored to Vestas instead of Nuon. This degree of tailoring to an external 
supplier indicates a certain, medium to low,  form  of asset specificity which cán potentially 
have a negative strategic bargaining effects for Nuon. After an initial contract, as stated, a 
recontracting is often not granted to Vestas which means that recontracting disadvantages 
do not affect the asset specificity and only a medium to low score is given.  
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Finally, a form of human asset specificity lies in the fact that Vestas has certain dedicated 
teams  on Nuon wind park sites. The dedicated teams are fixed personnel of Vestas,  
dedicated to a wind park site which actively perform maintenance and service checks on the 
site.  Strictly economically speaking it could be beneficial for Vestas to employ Vestas 
maintenance personnel to a geographically wider area than a specific wind park. The below 
quote illustrates the importance of the dedicated teams: 
 
Quote 2 nl 
“I: ‘Nee, kun je ook heel moeilijk vastleggen. Je kunt wel een document hebben waarin je 
zegt: ‘We hebben alles doorgesmeerd’, maar daar staat niet direct in van: ‘Jongens, dat 
lager, dat piepte de vorige keer zo’, want dat kun je er niet inzetten. 
I: Kun je daar een voorbeeld van geven om aan te geven hoe wezenlijk dat is? 
G: Bijvoorbeeld 14 dagen terug komen die jongens in een windmolen voor onderhoud en 
bellen mij: X, we weten niet wat het is, maar er zit een heel raar geluid in deze windmolen. 
Vervolgens hebben ze het onderhoud gedaan en hebben eigenlijk niks kunnen vinden. Maar 
ze zeggen: ‘We durven hem toch niet in bedrijf te nemen, want er zit een heel raar geluid in.’ 
Daar hebben we een boroscopisch onderzoek laten doen. Een boroscopisch onderzoek is dat 
je er met een speciaal lampje met een camera op een stokje in gaat kijken. En het bleek toch 
dat de tandwielkast in die windmolen niet al te best meer is. Dus doordat zij erin kwamen, 
een wat ander geluid hoorden dan de vorige keer, hebben we nu besloten dat die 
tandwielkast vervangen moet worden”.  
 
Quote 2  eng 
“No that is very hard to specify on paper. You can have a document which states:  ‘We 
lubricated everything’, but it wont specify that a certain bearing made a slightly different 
noise  because that is not specifiable 
I: Can you give an example of that, to show how essential that is?  
G: For example fourteen days ago the guys enter a wind turbine for service and they call me: 
X, we don’t now what it is but there is a strange sound in this wind turbine. They executed 
the normal service procedure and could not find anything strange or deviating. They did 
however say, We do not dare to commission the turbine because we hear a very odd sound. 
So we execue a boroscopic inspection. A boroscopic inspection means that you take a look 
with a special light and camera on a stick. It turned out that the gear box in the turbine 
wasn’t in a good condition... So, because of the fact that they fysically entered the turbine, 
hear a slightly different noise, we now decided that the gear box must be replaced”. 
 
Both quotes indicate that certain knowledge of the operation of the wind turbines ís tacit, 
and therefore not  easily transferred to paper. An interviewee responded to the above quote  
that in case of a swap to another (non Vestas) service party, the wind turbines would 
possibly not work as good for a short while and it could take ‘some weeks’ to achieve the 
level of output (of wind power) as with the previous service party. The above stated is 
ranked as a medium form of human asset specificity. 
 
The expected availability of site specificity, due to the fact that the wind farms are all 
location bound, is not available in higher form in this case study. In the Vestas –Nuon case 
the normal life span of a wind turbine is 15-20 years meaning that there is an end date in 
which the wind farms are economically no longer viable. Currently, in 2015, Vattenfall is 
planning for the decommission of a set of older windturbines in Windpark ‘De Tochten’ in 
the North of the Netherlands. Two interviewees confirm that there is a world wide demand 
for older wind turbines which means that, after a buyer is found the turbines will be 
decommissioned, physically transported and build up on a new location elsewhere. The fact 
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that it is economically viable and technically possible to relocate the wind turbines indicates 
that the site specificity for the shore wind farms ii low.  
 
Control Mechanisms  
A main control mechanism between Nuon and Vestas  is the contract agreement between 
Nuon and Vestas in which the terms of maintenance, output performance, liability, 
litigation, ending of contract etcetera  is described. When a new park with Vestas wind 
turbines is installed, a contract for maintenance or a contract for maintenance ánd output 
guarantee can be chosen. In case of an output guarantee, an AOM 4000 or higher contract, 
Vestas guarantees an output performance of 97% of the time for the wind park or wind 
turbine,  otherwise a penalty or bonus  is paid.  Áfter the initial contract, Nuon’s  general 
policy is to recontract the maintenance of a wind park to a local (non manufacturing) service 
party for cost reasons. Vestas is mostly nót contracted for general maintenance after an 
initial period.  
 
Vestas offers  standardized contracts which vary from a low to a high standard of offered 
services and guarantees. Lower standard  AOM ‘Active Output Management’ contracts start 
with the coding ‘1000’ and go all the way up to an AOM 5000 contract. An AOM 1000 
contract ‘only’ consists of  standard service on demand by Nuon. An AOM 2000 contract has 
added scheduled and unscheduled  maintenance. An AOM 3000 contract has included 
software updates for the controller software and the AOM 4000 and AOM 5000 contract 
forms  have an output guarantee for Vestas.  
Nuon currently only has the AOM 2000 contract (spread over 4 wind parks, 32 older V66 
turbines) for its older wind parks. Other parks are being serviced by a Vestas AOM 4000 
contract (spread over 2 wind parks, consisting of 5  newer V90 wind turbines).  
The fact that a bonus malus is being paid on the actual delivery of a certain output level for 
the AOM 4000 is a clear result control. The standard maintenance contract AOM 2000 can 
be seen as an action control in which standard rules and regulations on maintenance and 
service are being stated. In general, much of the relationship between Nuon and Vestas is 
governed by the procedures, prices and regulations in the contract. The four describes spare 
parts are also formally regulated within the contract. In general the available asset specificity 
within the relationship Vestas-Nuon is causally regulated and governed by the formal 
contracts.  
 
A second control mechanism in the relationship between Nuon and Vestas is cultural control 
and is visible in the availability of the dedicated teams which represent a medium for of 
human asset specificity. As described before, much of the relationship between Vestas and 
Nuon is formally regulated bij de the contract(s) of a specific site. The availability of the 
dedicated teams in which personnel are dedicated to a specific site is nót described.  One 
interviewee stated that face to face contact and a chat is a normal and preferred way of 
contact. Another interviewee stated that he doesn’t rely on a standard service notification 
‘done’ when a repair is done but that he wants to talk to the person to know what really 
happened. Trust is mentioned  as a factor in the cooperation and an example was given 
when a certain person was ‘not’ trusted, more checks were made to see if actual work was 
actually being performed and pressure was exercised to transfer this person elsewhere. In 
general a medium form of personnel and cultural control is used for the control of the 
available human asset specificity.  
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Table 3;  overview asset specificity and control mechanisms Vestas Nuon 
Asset 
specificity 
form  
Examples  Which side?   Level  Control  
Mechanism 
per form    
Dominant 
control 
mechanism  
Physical  service parts, 
wind turbines   
Lock in of 
Nuon  
Medi
um  
Action for  
AOM 2000   
Result for 
AOM 4000  
Action control 
Human  Dedicated 
teams  
Lock in of 
Vestas 
Medi
um  
Cultural  
procedural Tailoring of  
contracts 
Lock in of 
Nuon  
Medi
um to 
low  
Action for  
AOM 2000   
Result for 
AOM 4000   
 
 
Hypotheses 
In the case study it is shown that physical asset specificity leads to action control and 
therefore hypothesis B is confirmed.  Within the case study, a relative high form of physical 
asset specificity is present in the scarcity of certain spare parts of the wind turbine. In 
general however,  physical asset specificity is not high due to the fact that many parts of a 
Vestas wind turbine are interchangeable so an overall  medium score is given.  The physical 
asset specificity is governed and controlled mainly by the formal contract between Nuon and 
Vestas.  A small part of these contract have a result control mechanisms, based on the 
output guarantee of 97%. In most cases however, the contracts have a dominant  action 
control mechanism and describe standard rules and procedures withi th relationship. 
 
In the case study it is also shown that human asset specificity leads to cultural control and 
therefore hypothesis A is confirmed . The connection of dedicated teams to a specific wind 
park site is beneficial in building up tacit knowledge of the specific site and wind turbines. 
The human asset specificity is being influenced and steered by trust and therefore has a 
personnel and cultural control mechanism in place. The level of cultural control can however 
not be considered dominant in the overall relationship.  
 
In the case study it is shown that procedural asset specificity leads to action control. The 
level of procedural asset specificity however is medium to low. In section 6, conclusion and 
discussion I will further elaborate on this finding  
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5  Case study Oxyma-Nuon  
 
Oxyma is a partner for companies in executing parts of their marketing process and 
increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of their marketing their activities. Oxyma, has 
very recently been rebranded and operated under a set of different names as a consequence 
of a capital investment by private equity partner Nordian capital partners. Nordian Captital 
Partners has a majority stake in Oxyma.  Oxyma has grown out to be a market leader for 
data driven marketing services. Oxyma works for for companies like BMW, Vodafone, Air 
France KLM and Nuon. The partnership between Oxyma and Nuon exists uninterruptedly for 
over 13 years and has a yearly turnover of roughly  €2mln per year.  Oxyma is located in the 
cities of Amsterdam and Rotterdam and employs over 250 marketing and IT professionals. 
 
Nuon is a traditional Dutch utility company and has been taken over in 2009 by a Swedish, 
state owned Utility company, named Vattenfall AB. An international Business Area within 
Vattenfall is Business Area (BA) Customers and Solutions. In this Area Nuon has located all its 
customer and sales activities for business and consumer customers. The start of the 
liberalization of the dutch electricity market in 2001 for Nuon meant that for the first time, 
customers could choose a different electricity supplier for durable ‘green’ electricity. In 2004 
the dutch electricity and gas market was being open and liberalized for all commodity 
products including normal ‘grey’ electricity and gas. As an actor on a fully liberalized market 
environment, Nuon had to invent, professionalize and scale up their marketing activities as 
of what customers to select, hów to approach them and how to process and validate new 
customer orders for electricity and gas.  Because of the lack of market and IT expertise on 
how to set up and manage such an operation internally, Nuon decided to outsource the 
processing and technical validation of new customer orders. Up until now, Oxyma executes 
the processing and validation of all new customer orders for Nuon by an IT tool called RPM, 
Response Process Management .  
 
More recently, as the electricity and gas market and marketing as a whole has changed to a 
more digital approach. Also the need for more personalized marketing and sale methods has 
grown significantly. In the past, marketing campaigns were executed by subscribing 
thousands of customers with a single, one size fits all,  application card or by advertising a 
specific product for all customers. If the customer called and wanted to order a different 
product than advertised, often no sale was possible. Marketing and sales was organized by a 
sale channel meaning channel A (e.g. internet) offered product 1,2  and 3 and sales channel 
B (e.g. telemarketing) only offered product 4,5 and 6.  The trend for marketing lies in 
offering customers more and more individual, customer specific offers which the customer 
can order by the sale channel he or she chooses. This trend is called micro campaigning.  
 
Nuon has  attracted Oxyma to make their marketing process smarter and select and target 
more specific groups of customers instead of targeting large amounts of customers with the 
same messages. Nuon and Oxyma combined these activities under the name  Next 
Generation Marketing (NGM)  
 
Asset specificity findings  
The below quote is an answer from a Nuon respondent to the question what would happen 
if, hypothetically speaking, the cooperation between Nuon and Oxyma would stop.  
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Quote 3 nl:  
“Uiteindelijk is wat het functioneel doet nog niet eens zo heel erg ingewikkeld en hebben wij 
zelf met name ook bedacht. Alleen, de toepassing daarvan binnen de Oxyma-omgeving is dat 
we daar specifieke software tegenaan hebben geplakt. Allemaal Oracle databases. je moet 
compleet opnieuw dat technisch landschap opbouwen en je moet die mensen van die nieuwe 
organisatie gaan leren hoe onze processen, hoe die werken en hoe wij die in de systemen 
willen hebben. Daar zit met name de tijd in. Voor NGM en RPM bij elkaar denk ik dat je zo 
een jaar verder bent.  Of je moet zeggen: ‘Ik wil het niet per se conform de NUON-regels, en 
de NUON-functionaliteiten, wensen, maar we moeten gewoon campagnes doen en dit zijn de 
producten, kanalen, en we gaan…”. 
 
Quote 3 eng:  
“In the end,  how it works functionally, is  not that complicated and we mostly invented it 
ourselves. Only the application of it within the Oxyma-environment is that we created 
specific software. All Oracle databases. You must  build that technical landscape from scratch 
on and you need to teach those people of the new organization now our processes work, and 
how we want them applied in our system landscape. That is the time consuming aspect. For 
NGM and RPM  together I think this will take a year at minimum. Or you have to say, ‘I don’t 
need to do this by the current Nuon rules and functionality and wishes and we only need to 
execute some campaigns and here are the given sales channels and let go!” 
 
The above quote is an answer from a Nuon respondent to the question what would happen 
if, hypothetically speaking, the cooperation between Nuon and Oxyma were to stop. Within 
the questioning of asset specificity three forms of asset specificity appeared significantly. 
Procedural asset specificity is available due to the way that RPM, the processing and 
validation of new customer orders, has been executed in a close cooperation with,  and 
supervision of Nuon. Internal, but also external sales partners of Nuon e.g. the commercial 
company gaslicht.com and several telemarketing companies are delivering their sale directly 
to Oxyma. Oxyma validates if the sales orders are delivered correct and sometimes adds info 
itself or, sends them back to the sales party for adjustment. After this process, Oxyma sends 
the sales in a Nuon specific data format to Nuon after which the sales are put into the Nuon 
Customer Relationship Management IT system. Although performance indicators are used as 
a sanity check, they are not very challenging and  Oxyma is mostly valued for it’s quality and 
trustworthiness (Quarterly report Q4 2016). Oxyma possesses a lot of tacit  knowledge of the 
process in general but also of  Nuon’s sales partners as to how to deliver and validate the 
sales orders.  Oxyma, is directly communicating and steering to external sales companies 
which makes the procedural connection between Nuon and Oxyma complex and intense.  
 
For Oxyma, the processing and validation of sales is ‘core’ business. RPM is an end-of-life 
product which is no longer subject to large optimzations. The execution of the process is 
complex but fully standardized and mapped by Oxyma. For NGM, the procedural asset 
specificity is not a high due to the fact that procedures and workflows are relatively new and 
not yet altered much which means that they are not that much tied together as RPM.  The 
managing director of Oxyma stated that much of the future functionality is still in the heads 
of person x (director Customers and Sales B2C NL) and person y (contract partner Oxyma). 
Therefore also from Oxyma side much less Nuon specific logic and processes are yet fully 
implemented which means procedural asset specificity for NGM is not very high.  
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Due to the fact that Oxyma ‘only’ executes the process as part of the contract but Nuon is 
more dependent on the process for the their core customer business, the procedural asset 
specificity for Nuon is considered high. The procedural asset specificity for Oxyma is 
considered medium. 
 
Concerning the physical asset specificity. For the development of IT tooling for its customers, 
Oxyma has a policy in place in which it deliberately invests or disinvests in software which it 
purchases from larger suppliers like Oracle or IBM. Oxyma looks to operate the basic 
components of their software for other clients but also tailors a part of the software for 
specific client wishes. For an upgrade of RPM in 2011 Oxyma invested in a specific Oracle 
software named  ‘SOA Suite’ and made an agreement with Nuon to pay for that investment 
in yearly fees (around +/- yearly  €50.000 is booked as investment assignable to Nuon). Nuon 
however also pays for software updates on SOA Suite as well.  In this case, Oxyma invested 
for a large part on the demand of longer time partner Nuon so the dedicated asset 
specificity in this case is medium to low for Oxyma who still has a small strategic bargaining 
disadvantage on this dedicated investment.   
 
Regarding the software itself, ‘Oracle SOA Suite’ and ‘IBM Campaign Management’, a part of 
this software is being tailored to customer Nuon and another part is being kept general. An 
estimate of 50/50 is being given by an interviewee on Oxyma side as to how much has been 
modified to Nuon preferences. It is difficult to state that 50% of the software is therefore 
highly physical asset specific because Oxyma also uses the software for other clients and this 
study gives no insight in that. I cán be stated that, due to the moderate to high fine-tuning of 
software to Nuon preferences, also physical asset specificity is medium. In the two before 
stated asset specificities also some overlap is available. The physical asset specificity in the 
software is used within a process which  is tailored to Nuon and which contains the high 
procedural asset specificity. Also the dedicated asset specificity caused by the specific 
investment in Oracle SOA Suite can be seen in the light of the procedural asset specificity.  
 
Within the 13 years of cooperation, an extensive amount of tacit knowledge and a close 
relationship has been built up.  Both elements are important and contribute to human asset 
specificity. Nuon has certain key personnel  in place which is almost uniquely tied to partner 
Oxyma . Campaign marketeers who invent and create certain campaigns, A key person who 
is responsible and dedicated 100%  for the implementation of NGM.  Operational employees 
who assess certain customer applications(which is for a large part described in standard 
procedures), persons who see to the performance and contracts. An exact figure is hard to 
give but probably 3-4 employees are dedicated full time to Oxyma. All these persons work 
within tooling and procedures that have been made up in the last 13 years of close 
cooperation.  
 
Considering human asset specificity, Oxyma has embedded its client specific activities with it 
partners in a client service team which is dedicated to Nuon specifically. The Nuon client 
team consists of an account manager, two software developers and two process managers. 
The level of knowledge which is solely used for Nuon purposes is estimated at 50%. The 
other 50% of knowledge within the team is applicable for general Oxyma purposes and can, 
for instance, be used if a person switches from one client team to another. Human asset 
specificity is considered high in the relationship between Nuon and Oxyma. High on Nuon 
side and high on Oxyma side.  
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Control mechanisms  
An important noting is the fact that the relationship between Nuon and Oxyma is good and 
intense. An interviewee on Nuon side states that ‘other’ relationships with other partners 
are being held against the good  the relationship with Oxyma, meaning that the cooperation 
is considered as a  ‘best practice’ internally for Nuon.  Key personnel on each side of the 
cooperation know each other for several years and implicit expectations are clear. This 
intense relationship contributes to the well being and performance of the cooperation and is 
hard to replace or rebuild. An interesting and supporting fact for the previous finding is that 
the management of Oxyma generally strives for a duration of two year in a specific client 
team after which an employee can rotate to another client team.  Oxyma then ‘softly’ 
pushes and promotes an employee to broaden its capabilities in an other client team. The 
average age of employees in the Nuon client team however is 7 years and, for two Oxyma 
employees covers almost the entire age of the relationship. On both Nuon and Oxyma side 
an event was mentioned where a new Oxyma colleage in the client team just didn’t ‘fit’. 
After mutual evaluation, the person was transferred to another position outside the client 
team. The previous example is a clear personnel control. In general, cultural control is a 
strong control mechanism within the relationship. From Nuon side and from Oxyma side 
signals have been given whether the high trust and not so challenging KPI’s on RPM are 
creating a certain blindness and are therefore actually blocking further improvement of the 
performance and cooperation. In the discussion section I will further elaborate on this topic.  
 
The management of Oxyma has a vision on how to manage their asset specificity ad how to 
mitigate the risks associated with that. For human asset specificity, personnel is encouraged 
to switch between customer accounts and broaden their horizons. For the Nuon client 
service team however no rotations have been made in the recent past. For preventing that 
software and processes are being tailored too much to customer preferences, Oxyma also 
has a policy in place. Specifically a team of consultants which are working across the client 
service teams and which are looking for general customer needs and the spreading of best 
practices across teams. One of their aims, at least for Oxyma as a whole is to minimize  lock-
ins in which specific software is only tailored to a single customer.  
 
The relationship between Nuon and Oxyma is formally regulated in a ‘raamovereenkomst’ in 
which the general services, purchasing terms, customer data policy, penalties for certain 
don’ts  and key persons are described. In the Service Level Agreement (SLA) aspects like 
escalation mechanisms and specific procedures are described. For RPM, a set of 
performance indicators is in place in which the response time of the processing and 
validation of customer orders is measured. These KPI’s haven’t changed much in time. When 
performance indicators  are not met, mutual, actions are formulated for improvement and 
in general, no punishment or rewards are given. The managing director of Oxyma describes 
the performance indicators  as a crucial ‘sanity’ factor which has to be in place before other 
things like future product development and relationship are discussed. 
 
Within the raamovereenkomst and SLA, an escalation procedure, procedures when the 
cooperation is being discontinued, quarterly meetings, data protection and KPI’s  etcetera 
are being specified. When asked whether following these procedures is a dominant control 
in the cooperation a negative answer is given. Oxyma does specifify their spent costst on a 2 
weekly basis and these costs are also checked on a two weekly base by Nuon. Procedures 
and performance are also  being discussed in report meetings but when not met, no 
penalties are given   The previous control can be qualified as an action control mechanism 
which is not dominant as a control mechanism. 
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For normal development activities in which software or processes are being developed, 
Nuon pays for the amount of hours that are spent on development of new services. No 
bonus element is paid and no fine is being charged when KPI’s are not met. In the contract 
only certain fines are describes for, e.g. bad handling of customer data and delays in 
processing etcetera.For NGM, not as much clearly described performance indicators 
compared to RPM are in place. For a new pilot in which Nuon and Oxyma both have learning 
goals, a performance element is created in which Nuon is paying Oxyma up to 50% bonus of 
the actual value of an investment. The bonus is however only given is the outcome of the 
pilot leads to above the average results, being extra new customers won for Nuon. Vice 
versa also a fine (Oxyma not receiving the actual invested costst) is given is the results are 
below average. This incentive is a strong result control mechanism but must also be seen in 
the light of the trusted relation between  both. In case of a pure result control, the partners 
dominant goal and main source of income is to achieve the targets. The profit, however, that 
Oxyma can gain is not larger than +/- 5% of the yearly budget of the the cooperation.  
 
The cooperation in general is evaluated twice a year with an evaluation in which the 
cooperation is mutually rated and both parties express how thing went and how the 
cooperation can improve further.  This evaluation is qualified as a cultural control.  
 
 
Table 4;  overview asset specificity and control mechanisms Oxyma -Nuon 
Asset 
specificity 
form 
 
Examples  Which side  level  Control 
mechanism 
per form 
 
Dominant 
Control 
mechanism 
 
Procedural Workflow 
processes    
Nuon and 
Oxyma  
Medium for 
Oxyma, High 
for Nuon  
cultural  Cultural 
Control  
Physical  IT Tooling & 
softwase  
Oxyma  medium to 
low for oxyma   
Action  and 
cultural  
Human  Client 
service 
teams and 
relationship 
Nuon and 
Oxyma 
high for 
Oxyma, 
medium for 
Nuon  
Cultural  
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Hypotheses 
In the case study Nuon-Oxyma it is shown that human asset specificity leads to cultural 
control and therefore hypothesis A is confirmed.  In the case study setting, human asset 
specificity has been shown to be present in in high form mainly in the client service teams on 
Oxyma side and  and the relationship between Nuon and Oxyma. This human asset 
specificity is governed by cultural control and therefore hypothesis A is confirmed.   
 
In the case study it is also shown that procedural  asset specificity leads to cultural control 
and therefore hypothesis A is confirmed. The measurability of the workflows and their 
output, is high for most performance indicators which measure the performance of services 
executed by Oxyma. This seems to lead to a more action control mechanism. Below the 
surface however, the output of the client team is in essence measured with ‘trust’ and 
‘quality’ and therefore a cultural control mechanism emerges. The  long working relationship 
of employees within the client service team  and the execution of new, uncertain marketing 
pilots, are not easily quantified which also support the claim that in case of low 
measureability,  cultural control mechanisms are preferred for governing human asset 
specificity.  
 
In the case study it is also shown that physical asset specificity leads to a mixed pattern of 
action and cultural control. In section 6, conclusion and discussion I will further elaborate on 
this finding.  
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6 Conclusions and discussion 
 
Overall 
In this study, it has been investigated how risks resulting from asset specifity within hybrid 
governance modes can be governed by control mechanisms. In the theoretical section, 
seven forms of asset specificity and three control mechanisms are identified which lead to 
the two hypotheses in this research.   
 
A. Within hybrid governance and in case of higher human asset specificity, procedural 
asset specificity and marketing asset specificity, due to the less measurable output, 
personnel and cultural controls will be used as dominant steering mechanisms.  
B. Within hybrid governance In case of higher physical asset specificity site specificity, 
dedicated asset specificity and temporal asset specificity, due to the more 
measurable output, result and action controls will be used as  dominant steering 
mechanisms.  
Both hypothesis were  investigated in two case studies and led to the conclusions:  
 
 Human asset specificity and  procedural  asset specificity led to cultural control and 
therefore hypothesis A is confirmed.    
 
 Physical asset specificity led to action control and therefore hypothesis B is 
confirmed.   
 
The case studies also demonstrated that  reciprocal investments or hostage taking, which 
represents the distribution of asset specificity on both sides of the collaboration, were an 
important control mechanism. Out of  case study result  tables  4.1 and 5.1. it can be 
concluded that in the case study Vestas-Nuon, a small lock-in for Nuon is present.  Added up, 
Nuon possesses a slightly larger level of asset specificity than Vestas.  In the case study 
Oxyma-Nuon there is a balance in asset specific investments on both sides.  Generally, in 
both case studies asset specificity levels are quite evenly distributed which could also be 
considered as another  important mechanisms for mitigating opportunistic behavior. 
 
In the case study Vestas-Nuon an interesting outcome was the fact that the found 
procedural asset specificity did not lead to  a cultural control mechanism but to a mixed 
action/result control mechanism. A possible explanation for this finding is the fact that the 
mutual hostage position of Vestas ánd Nuon is relatively balanced. Within this balance, 
opportunistic behavior is naturally low  and therefore the dominant action/result control 
mechanism is capable of absorbing and governing also amounts of procedural asset 
specificity.  
 
Human asset specificity and procedural asset specificity overlap.  
Vita (2011)  states that  “facets of asset specificity form distinct and interrelated, rather than 
substitute and isolated, dimensions of the construct”. In the Oxyma-Nuon case study this is 
visible in the connection of the level of procedural asset specificity with the level of human 
asset specificity. The connection of the workflow and processes are off course highly related 
to the level of tacit knowledge which is exercised by people who work with the workflow 
and processes. The two asset specificity forms should not be seen as separate elements.   
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Validity and reliability 
Concerning the internal validity, the establishment of causal relationships,  it can be argued 
that in the Vestas-Nuon case study, due to the absence of interviews on Vestas side ánd the 
medium (instead of high at Oxyma –Nuon) levels of asset specificity, the causal connection 
between the asset specificity and control mechanisms is not as strong as in the Oxyma-Nuon 
case study.  Concerning the construct validity, external validity  and reliability of the 
research, the already mentioned measures were followed when undertaking the case study 
interviews.  
 
Practical relevance  
The practical relevance of this research is the fact that organizations are given insight in 
factors that determine how risks of asset specificity can be governed by control mechanisms.  
Based on these factors, organizations can determine whether their hybrid governance setup 
is in line with the conclusions and findings of this research and possible alterations should be 
made.  
 
Suggestions for future research  
An interesting suggestion for future research is to look into the effects of high levels 
different asset specificity forms on both sides of a cooperation. What control mechanism is 
best in place if partner A  mainly has a high level of human asset specificity and partner  B  
has a high physical asset specific in place. How does this balanced distribution of different 
forms of asset specificity work out qua effective control mechanisms for protecting and 
governing these assets?  
 
Secondly, in the case study Vestas-Nuon it is also shown that procedural asset specificity 
leads to a mixed pattern of action control and result control. The level of procedural asset 
specificity however is medium to low. Future case study research on high level of procedural 
asset specificity, more specific, a  formal contract between two companies,  could point out 
if the causal connection to the action and result control mechanisms is also confirmed.  
 
Thirdly, an interesting topic in the Oxyma–Nuon case study is that, however there is a 
significant level of trust and cultural control which leads to lower levels of opportunistic 
behavior, there are doubts whether this trust is creating a certain blindness. An interesting 
topic for future result is to investigate what the boundaries of control mechanisms are, and 
to what level they effectively mitigate opportunistic behavior within high asset specificity.  
 
In the case study Vestas-Nuon, a medium (and not high) form of physical asset specificity 
was found. Hypothesis B however also mentions site specificity, dedicated asset specificity 
and temporal asset specificity. It is interesting to confirm in practice if the hypothesis is also 
confirmed for a setting with high physical asset specificity and  the three other asset 
specificities in high form.  
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8 Appendix 
The picture on the title page represents one of the 22 new built  2004 Athens Olympic  
stadiums. After the games, 21 of the initial 22 stadiums are left unused and and total a loss 
of $14 to $15 billion dollar is calculated for the Greek government. The loss  and might  have 
contributed to the countries bankruptcy in 2009.  
http://www.cnbc.com/id/45943877/page/5   
Consulted on 2nd  February 2016 
The high investment in the assets, the stadiums, were made, together with the Olympic 
committee for a particular use or purpose and can not be easily replaced to another location 
(site specificity) or use(physical asset specificity). In this case, the Greek government and not 
the partnering International Olympic Committee (IOC)fully took this risk and were not 
backed by any reciprocal investments from the Olympic committee.  
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9 Interview questions  
 Question list:  
 
category Questions Talking schedule 
1 interviewee personal Wat is your name and current position? 
2 interviewee personal Have you had other positions  in the collaboration?
3 General collaboration 
What is the purpose of the collaboration ? (delivery of products, 
delivery of services, developing new products, profit maximizing, 
learning from partner) 
The general questions 1-7 are 
always asked 
4 General collaboration What does each partner contribute to the collaboration 
5 General collaboration How was the partner selected? 
6 General asset specificity 
Are there  specific asset are in the collaboration which are only of 
value within the collaboration and which, if taken out of the 
collaboration, have less value?
Hypothetically, What if the collaboration with the vendor were to 
stop immediately? Which assets would have no or much less  
value? ) Which assets would have to be amortized? Which assets 
would have to be retrained or redeveloped?) 
Can you name them? 
Explain the defintions to 
interviewee. 4-12 . See first 
tab. 
7 General asset specificity 
Can you charcterize these into more (a) human asset specificity 
(knowledge) © brand asset specificity, (c)physical asset specificity or 
(d) Site specificity. Interviewer explains 
Switch to Human, Physical,  
brand or site  specificity, 
depending on the outcome of 
the question
8 General asset specificity 
General & per Asset Specificity form. What protection mechanism do 
you have in place to protect your business from high asset specificity? 
Asked in general and per per 
asset specificity form. 
9 Human Asset specificity 
To what extent is knowledge an important driver in the 
collaboration. Can you give specific examples. 
asked depending on question 
5-7 
10 Human Asset specificity Do you regard the partners contribution  as unique?  
11 Human Asset specificity 
To what extent are skills, knowledge and experience tailored to 
the specific supplier? 
12 Human Asset specificity 
To what extent is tacit  knowledge) knowledge an important driver 
in the collaboration. Tacit knowledge is hard to specifify or write 
down, how to manage a specific team,  expetise in building a 
product.  
13 Human Asset specificity 
What part of the knowledge&expertise  is highly asset specific?  
In other words knowledge which is worth little outside the 
collaboration or is only applicable outside after major adjustment. 
14 Human Asset specificity 
Are any of the above  knowledge and expertise contributions 
formalized? How? 
15 Human Asset specificity 
How do you asess your contribution qua human asset specificity 
compared to the partner? 
16 Human Asset specificity 
What was each partners initial contribution to the collaboration 
regarding knowledge and expertise? 
17 Human Asset specificity 
What was each partners evolving (after contract signing) 
contribution to the collaboration regarding knowledge and 
expertise?  
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18 Physical asset specificity 
To what extent are physical asets (goods/infrastructure)  an 
important driver in the collaboration? . Can you give specifi 
examples. 
asked depending on question 
5-7 
19 Do you regard the partners contribution  as unique?  
20 Physical asset specificity 
How likely is it that if , hypothetically, the partner would step out, 
the physical assets can be redeployed and maintained  without 
alterations made to them  (very likely <> not likely) 
21 Physical asset specificity 
What part of the physical asset  is specifically tailored to the 
collaboration itself (I.o.w; the asset is worth little outside the 
collaboration or stand alone ) 
22 Physical asset specificity 
What is the extent extent of the actual investments in physical 
assets made by the partner specifically for the purpose of the 
relationship 
23 Physical asset specificity 
What was each partners initial contribution to the collaboration 
regarding unique physical assets?
24 Physical asset specificity 
What was each partners evolving (after contract signing) 
contribution to the collaboration regarding regarding unique 
physical assets?
25 Brand asset specificity 
To what extent is brand value and reputation  an important driver 
in the collaboration . Can you give specific examples. 
asked depending on question 
5-7 
26 Brand asset specificity 
What was each partners initial contribution to the collaboration 
regarding brand / marketing value? 
27 Brand asset specificity 
Are there currently ant transactions in the collaboration which 
involve activities with a direct and high effect on the overall firm 
performance
28 Brand asset specificity 
To what extent is the Brand image or reputation of the company 
dependant on the performance or image of the partner? 
29 Brand asset specificity Are any of the above  possible situations formalized? How? 
30 Brand asset specificity 
How do you asess your dependance and vulnerability to negative 
or positive aspects of brand asset  specificity compared to the 
partner? 
31 Brand asset specificity 
What was each partners initial dependance regarding brand asset 
specificity 
32 Brand asset specificity 
What was each partners evolving dependance regarding brand 
asset specificity 
33 Site specificity 
To what extent is site specificity and important driver in the 
collaboration . Can you give specifi c examples. 
asked depending on question 
5-7 
34 Site specificity 
What was each partners initial contribution to the collaboration 
regarding  site specificity  
35 Site specificity 
To what extent is the proximity of the partners an issue in the 
relationship? F.i. is the location of assets a key  element in the 
cooperation? 
36 Site specificity 
Would there be a high impact on the relationship if the partner 
were to fysicalle move, relocate it's operations/manufacturing 
facility  or specific assets 
37 Site specificity 
How do you asess your vulnerability qua site specificity  compared 
to the partner? 
38
What was each partners initial dependance regarding site 
specificity 
39 Site specificity 
What was each partners evolving dependance regarding site 
specificity  
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40 General asset specificity 
Are any  arrangements made for protection or ownership of 
specific assets? (Veto, Non disclosure agreement, authorized 
access, informal management agreements?) 
Based on the sort of 
specificity,  Human, Physical,  
brand or site the below 
questions; (39-44) are being  
asked for more clarity on the 
specific asset specificity form.  
41 General asset specificity 
What risks do you see regarding the vulnerability and protection of 
these assets? 
42 General asset specificity 
To what extent does a parent need the contributions of the other 
parent?; I.e think of the examples given of the specific assets. 
43 General asset specificity 
How crucial are the parental contributions for the functioning of 
the collaboration? 
44
general management 
control 
What control measures are being used to govern the asset specific 
elements as discussed? 
The general questions 43-44 
are asked to screen what 
management control 
mechanisms are in place
45
general management 
control Can you give specific examples of these measures? 
46 Result control 
To what extent are the goals of the collaboration  in casu 
communicated to every  relevant layer in your organization? Does 
everybody know exactly what to perform, relatively to the goals of 
the collaboration? 
Depending on the mentioned 
management control 
mechanisms 43-44, the below 
questions are being asked to 
determine whether a result, 
action  or personnell/cultural 
control mechanisms is in 
place.    
47 Result control 
Is good performance on goals&targets(KPI's ) the  main driver for 
or a succesfull collaboration? 
48 Result control 
To what extent are rewards (gain sharing, bonus) based on 
personal  performance (in contract to team/group performance) 
49 Result control 
Are bonus incentives incorporated in the collaboration. More 
specifically incentives   within a short (6motnths-1yr) lag between 
performance and compensation? Can you give  examples? 
50 Result control 
Quote/agree or disagree. A manager/employee in the 
collaboration is normally not held accountable for unfavorable 
outcomes or credited with favourable ones if they are clearly due 
to causes not under his control. 
51 Result control How effective  can results be measured within the collaboration ? 
52 Action control 
Which restraining activities are being put on employees to prevent 
certain things that should not be done?
 E.g: Examples of physical constraints: limited access to 
information, ID card readers? Safety measures, helmets, 
E.g: Examples of administrative constraints: Decision or 
expenditure caps. Separation of duties &  tasks
E.g:   Examples of preaction review: Multiple reviews of plans 
(bottom up, peer to peer) before approval
53 Action control 
To what extent are employees being held accountable for actions 
taken?Actions resulting from  rules, procedures, work instructions. 
Are there any rewards or punishments connected in not following 
these procedures? 
54 Action control 
Are any tasks being performed double (redundant) for the 
purpose of increasing the probability that it will be succesfully 
fufilled? 
55 personnel control
What importance is placed on the selection of the right key 
personnell in the Collaboration? Reference checks? Education 
experience? Past success (track record) social skills? 
56 personnel control
How is the employee selection of personnell in the collaboration 
done? Pre screened? Informal contacts? Open applications on 
internet? 
57 personnel control
What is the effort and intensity of training for employees and staff 
in the collaboration?
58 Cultural control
Is there a specific culture 'way of doing'  within  the 
collaboration?Is this culture different than outside in the rest of 
the company/division?
59 Cultural control
How would you describe the emotional ties to the 
collaboration/vendor  in regard to other collaboratio/vendors? 
60 Cultural control
To what extent are rewards (gain sharing, bonus) based on team  
performance &achievements?  
61 Cultural control
Are there specific dress codes or specific vocabulary which 
distinghuishes the collaboration with the outside world
62
Evolution of  asset 
specificity 
Have there been any changes in the sort of asset specificity during 
the previous years? How? 
63
Evolution of  asset 
specificity 
Have there been any changes in the intensity of asset specificity 
during the previous years? How? 
64
Evolution of control 
mechanisms 
Have there been any changes in the sort of controls in the previous 
years?  How? 
65
Evolution of control 
mechanisms 
Have there been any changes in the intensity of the used controls 
in the previous years? How?  
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 Definitions used with question list: 
 
nr what description 
1 Result control In case of result control partners can focus only on results and intervene when targets 
are not being met or potentially not being met. Result control can ensure that 
employees are promised rewards for producing the desired results or punishments for 
results that should be avoided, thereby stimulating employees to take the desired 
actions. 
2 personnel control / 
Cultural control
Partners can take steps to ensure either that  employees and managers are willing to 
perform well by their own intrinsic motivation. The main driver for personnel control is 
a natural present force that pushes employees to the organization’s goals and derives 
self-respect and self-satisfaction. 
Management and employees are given trust as a substitute for more formal action and 
result controls.  Trust enables them to perform on their own motivation. Cultural 
controls are also away of control in which group pressure plays a major role.
3 Action Control Action control means that control is exercised so that certain desirable actions are 
taken (or undesirable actions not taken). E.g. management can guarantee itself the 
right to make or approve certain key decisions; they can physically secure valuable 
company assets  or they can require personnel to follow certain pre-approved policies 
or contract terms.  
5 Asset specificity defintion the degree to which an asset can be redeployed to alternative uses by alternative users 
without sacrifice of productive value (Williamson 1996, p59)  To be more concrete,  In a 
high asset specific environment, an asset can not, or can barely be redeployed to 
alternative use without sacrifice of productive value. 
6 Asset specificity effects Dekker (2004) states that asset Specificity, specifically within joint ventures can give 
rise to appropriation concerns which describe the concern when one partner invests 
more asset specific knowledge or asset in a relationship than the other. The concern of 
being vulnerable from the appropriated investments by the other party gives rise to 
potentially opportunistic behavior
Examples of asset specificity risks 
7 Site specificity What is it?
A situation where the buyer and the supplier are involved in a ‘cheek-by-jowl’ 
relationship with one another due to the importance of close proximity in reducing 
inventory and other related processing costs. However, once in place, the assets 
involved are highly immobile and, thus, the cost of their relocation is very high. 
Examples: 
A coal energy plant, privately held,  which is deliberately located near a commercially 
exploited harbor which is its only source of supply is an example of site specificity. 
The deliberate location of some electric generating plants next to particular mines, 
with the expectation of a potential long-term coal supply relationship. Entry of new suppliers and buyers in 
physical proximity which will offer 
the party with less asset specificity a 
strategic bargaining advantage 
8 Physical asset specificity What is it:
Assets are developed or customized to a particular use or purpose. It refers to 
investments in physical assets that are tailored to a specific transaction and have few 
alternative uses, owing to their specific (design) characteristics
Examples:
A die which is especially fitted to a specific formula 1 racing team car. 
An individual supplier which makes customized  wings for a specific Boeing plane, this 
particular wing manufacturing facility would have little value to the supplier in other 
transactional relationships. 
Conflicts which can endanger the 
long term cooperation in which the 
asset specific investment is of value.  
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9 Human asset specificity What is it: 
Human asset specificity refers to the degree to which skills, knowledge and experience 
of a firm’s personnel are specific to the requirements of dealing with another firm 
Examples:
Employees develop firm specific skills or knowledge. E.g. knowledge and training for  a 
very specific item. Backlog handling of work items within a customized IT system of a 
service company. 
A unique technical skills and experience required in carrying out the activity being 
transacted.
Knowledge specific assets (Dibbern et al. 2005) that arise from learning-by-doing 
(Williamson 1996), and which are not easily transferable, owing to their limited 
application in other work settings (Lamminmaki 2005). 
Leakage of crucial knowledge of R&D 
investments which have not yet 
been commercially exploited 
10 Dedicated asset 
specificity 
What is it:
Dedicated assets occur when additions are made to an existing machine or device that 
would not be made but for the expectation of selling significant product to a particular 
customer on a long term basis. 
Examples 
A small sized company delivering half products to an original equipment manufacturer 
(OEM)  may invest in customizing a machine for the sake of delivering extra capacity, 
agreed in a contract with the OEM. When the OEM decides, or even threatens to 
discontinue the contract, overcapacity which cannot be sold elsewhere is the result. 
a product contract with one large customer may cause a firm to expand its capacity to 
meet demand, which would ultimately result in significant over-capacity and important 
financial disruption if the customer in question chooses not to renew the contract.
dedicated asset specificity could, under certain circumstances, be related to an 
investment made by the buyer, such as additional investment in laboratory accessories 
that help the firm to assess the quality of a bigger proportion of goods acquired.
Dedicated asset specificity is different from physical asset specificity. It refers to assets 
that are of general purpose as opposed to specialized uses (physical asset specificity), 
but which have been made for a particular transactional agreement that is likely to 
entail a long-term relationship. Should this relationship end prematurely, excess 
capacity will, however, be created.  
Conflicts which can endanger the 
long term cooperation in which the 
asset specific investment is of value. 
11 Temporal asset specificity What is it:
Specificity when timely responses by on-site human assets is vital. Temporal specificity 
refers to the importance of timing and co-ordination required by a transactional 
relationship. An asset is time specific if its value is highly dependent on it reaching the 
user within a specified, relatively limited period of time’. the need for precise 
scheduling within the transactional relationship
Examples: 
E.g. when building a house, or a block of houses, timely delivery of the right building 
materials and building professionals is key to a timely delivery of the completed 
house. 
In the case of shipbuilding, where the ability to hold buffer stock is limited, hence 
timely delivery becomes vital to prevent costly delays .
Service punctuality in order to prevent any deterioration in the quality of services.
11 Procedural asset 
specificity 
What is it: 
The degree a firm's workflows and processes are customized in line with the 
requirements of the exchange partner. Procedural asset specificity refers to 
organizational routines and workflows that are tailored to a particular transactional 
relationship and which are difficult to modify once created or to redeploy without 
value reduction. 
Examples:
If a commercial service company works with an outside  partner for delivering their 
sales and leads of commodity products, it may need to make large investments to align 
its procedures and IT processes so that the leads can be efficiently  transferred and 
handled. 
adaptation of the production process and system in the chemical manufacturing 
industry. For making a special product for an end customer. 
Lowering of quality standards and 
lowering continious improvement 
due to a service provider who 
realizes that its partner is locked in 
into a relationship  
12 Brand asset specificity What is it:
Specificity arising in the selling/execution phase of a product life cycle. Brand capital 
specificity can also relate to reputation management. 
Examples: 
Investments by two or more parties in a particular brand can lose their value very quick 
if the reputation of a company is compromised  (Buckler beer in the Netherlands). 
All activities which have a direct and high effect on the overall firm performance could 
be described as one of high brand capital specificity. A supplier could find itself in a 
position enabling it to intentionally or unintentionally cause damage to the buyer’s 
reputation.
A bad reputation of an outsourced  restaurant services could prove very costly, 
reputationwise,  to the overall hotel business.
Reputation, brand or image damage,  
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10    Attachments 
 
 Contract Vestas–Nuon / Different contracts per wind park* 
 Contract Oxyma–Nuon / 2Organize_2014_def contract signed.pdf*  
o Quarterly report Vestas-Nuon Q4 2016* 
 Case study interview transcripts* 
 
   *All attachments are available in the research database.  
 
 
 
